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"NO DAMAGE" CLAUSES IN
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS:
A CRITIQUE
A controversial aspect of competitively bid construction contract-
ing is the so-called "no damage"' provision. Especially common in
contracts advertised by private or local government entities,2 this ex-
culpatory clause purports to bar recovery by a contractor for delay
damages attributable to the actions of the owner.3 Typically, a con-
tract containing such a clause provides that although no monetary
compensation for these delays will be permitted, a time extension will
be granted, equal in length to the period by which the contractor's de-
lays are deemed 4 attributable to the actions of the owner. 5
1. Also known as a "no damages" or "no damage for delay" clause. Annot., 74
A.L.R.3d 187, 194 (1976). This annotation is also useful as a general collection of
cases involving the validity of "no damage" clauses.
2. See 4A J. McBRIDE & I. WACHTEL, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS § 32.10 (5] (1977)
(common practice to insert "no damage" clauses into contracts advertised by private,
i.e., nongovernmental, owners). For cases providing examples of "no damage" clauses
in contracts advertised by local government owners, see, e.g., F.D. Rich Co. v. Wil-
mington Hous. Auth., 392 F.2d 841 (3d Cir. 1968); Hawley v. Orange County Flood
Control Dist., 211 Cal. App. 2d 708, 27 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1963); Hallett Constr. Co. v.
Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 261 Iowa 290, 154 N.W.2d 71 (1967); A. Kaplen &
Son, Ltd. v. Housing Auth., 42 NJ. Super. 230, 126 A.2d 13 (1956); Ericksen v. Ed-
monds School Dist. No. 15, 13 Wn. 2d 398, 125 P.2d 275 (1942). Similar efforts by
local governmental owners to limit contractors' rights to impact damages were at
issue in V.C. Edwards Contracting Co. v. Port of Tacoma, 83 Wn. 2d 7, 514 P.2d 1381
(1973); Bignold v. King County, 65 Wn. 2d 817, 399 P.2d 611 (1965); City of Seattle
v. Dyad Constr., Inc., 17 Wn. App. 501, 565 P.2d 423 (1977).
3. "No damage" clauses may work to bar recovery by a contractor against an
owner, or by a subcontractor against its prime contractor. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Ash-
ton-Mardian Co., 357 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1966) ("no damage" clause barred sub-
contractor's recovery from prime contractor); J. MCBRIDE & I. WACHTEL, supra note 2,
§ 32.10[5]. In this comment, the party barred from additional recovery by a "no dam-
age" clause will for convenience be referred to as a "contractor." Similarly, the term
"owner" will encompass contract owners, prime contractors, and all their agents
which are insulated from liability for impact damages by a "no damage" provision.
4. The determination of how much time extension is granted on the basis of owner-
caused delay is generally reserved to the reasonable discretion of the architect or other
agent of the owner. See, e.g., the clause set forth at note 5 infra.
5. An example of a "no damage" clause recently upheld by the Washington court
of appeals is quoted in Nelse Mortensen & Co. v. Group Health Coop., 17 Wn. App.
703, 566 P.2d 560 (1977):
If... the contractor is delayed at any time in the progress of the work by any of
the following causes, the contract time shall be extended for such reasonable time
as the architect shall determine.... Such extensions shall postpone the beginning
of period for payment of liquidated damages but they and the events producing
them shall not be ground for claim by the contractor of damages or for addi-
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Generally, state courts and federal courts applying state law have
held such clauses effective to preclude claims by contractors for dam-
ages due to delays in commencing or completing the job which are at-
tributable to the owner. 6 In Washington, 7 "no damage" clauses have
been upheld by both the supreme court8 and most recently by the
court of appeals. 9
The enforcement of such "no damage" provisions, however, raises
serious policy questions. First, there is potential for an oppressive
"adhesion" contract10 in which a contractor is forced to bear broad li-
ability for unforeseeable delay costs arising from negligent or unrea-
sonable acts of the owner. Whether the clause was actually bargained
tional costs, expenses, overhead or profit or other compensation.
.2 Change Orders
.4 Causes beyond the control of the contractor ....
Id. at 706-07, 566 P.2d at 562 (emphasis in original).
6. Cases upholding the validity of "no damage" clauses include W.C. James, Inc.
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 485 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1973) (apparently applying Colorado
law to uphold a "no damage" clause where the delays involved were relatively minor
and the claim may have been devised mostly as an "afterthought"); F.D. Rich Co. v.
Wilmington Hous. Auth., 392 F.2d 841 (3d Cir. 1968) (upholding a "no damage"
provision under Delaware law); Lichter v. Mellon-Stuart Co., 305 F.2d 216 (3d Cir.
1962) (upholding a "no damage" provision, apparently under Pennsylvania law,
where the subcontractor was unable to sufficiently tie its damages to delays by the
prime contractor); Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Iowa S. Utils. Co., 355 F. Supp. 376
(S.D. Iowa 1973) (upheld "no damage" provision under Iowa law, but purported to
construe it narrowly); Hallett Constr. Co. v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 261 Iowa
290, 154 N.W.2d 71 (1967) ("no damage" clauses strictly construed and not enforced
when delay resulted from fraud or active interference by party seeking the benefit
thereof); E.M. Freeman v. Department of Highways, 253 La. 105, 217 So. 2d 166
(1968); Wes-Julian Constr. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 351 Mass. 588, 223 N.E.2d 72
(1967); St. Germain & Son, Inc. v. Taunton Redev. Auth., 340 N.E.2d 916 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1976) (dictum); Siefford v. Housing Auth., 192 Neb. 643, 223 N.W.2d 816
(1974); Ace Stone, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 47 NJ. 431, 221 A.2d 515 (1966)
(dictum); A. Kaplen & Son, Ltd. v. Housing Auth., 42 NJ. Super. 230, 126 A.2d 13
(1956); Peckham Road Co. v. State, 32 App. Div. 2d 139, 300 N.Y.S.2d 174 (1969),
aff'd, 28 N.Y.2d 734, 269 N.E.2d 826, 321 N.Y.S.2d 117 (1971). SeeJ. SvEET, LEGAL
ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING AND THE CONSTRUCTION PROCESS 458 (1970);
Annot., 74 A.L.R.3d 187, 203 & n.63 (1976) ("no damage" clauses are generally held
or recognized to be valid).
7. In this comment, decisions of the Washington courts are often drawn upon for
illustrative purposes, but the essential principles of argument presented are of broad
applicability in the various jurisdictions where "no damage" clauses are upheld.
8. E.g., Ericksen v. Edmonds School Dist. No. 15, 13 Wn. 2d 398, 125 P.2d 275
(1942) ("no damage" clause effectively barred contractor's claim for damages result-
ing from owner's hindrances and delays).
9. "No damage" clauses were held effective to bar contractor's recovery of impact
damages. Nelse Mortensen & Co. v. Group Health Coop., 17 Wn. App. 703, 566 P.2d
560 (1977); Rowland Constr. Co. v. Beall Pipe & Tank Corp., 14 Wn. App. 297, 540
P.2d 912 (1975).
10. See generally Duncan, Adhesion Contracts: A Twentieth Century Problem for
a Nineteenth Century Code, 34 LA. L. REV. 1081 (1974); note 45 infra.
472
Vol. 53: 471, 1978
"No Damage" Clauses
for becomes an issue in this context, as does the question of uncon-
scionability.1 In addition, it is doubtful whether the enforcement of
"no damage" clauses is consistent with the fundamental principles of
law governing analogous liquidated damage provisions. 12 The issue
here is whether a "no damage" clause functions in effect as a liqui-
dated damage provision, and if so, whether the former ought not be
governed by the same legal tests for enforceability which apply to the
latter.
This comment concludes that "no damage" clauses should not be
enforced because they are generally imposed without genuine bar-
gaining and they tend to work oppressive results on a contractor by
subjecting it to a risk of substantial and unforeseeable liability for
damages arising from delays attributable to the owner. An analogy to
the law of liquidated damages provides a useful illustration of the type
of inequity which is promoted by enforcing "no damage" provisions,
as well as a doctrinal basis for holding such clauses invalid.
I. TYPICAL APPLICATIONS OF "NO DAMAGE"
CLAUSES
The effect of a "no damage" clause is to preclude the contractor's
recovery of "impact damages,' 3 defined as those indirect costs aris-
11. See note 44 infra for a discussion of the potential application by analogy of
the rule of unconscionability as embodied in the Uniform Commercial Code.
12. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339 (1932), quoted at text accompanying
note 92 infra.
13. Also known as "impact delay damages," "ripple damages," or generally as a
component of indirect costs. Corbin explains impact damages as follows:
The building contractor's claim for damages may be based in part on losses due
to the owner's causing unreasonable delay in completion. The contractor's ma-
chinery and labor force may have been kept idle, when but for the delay they
would have been income producing .... It is proper to admit expert testimony
as to the rental value of machinery, the extra amounts paid to hold the labor
force together, and also a reasonable proportion of overhead costs fairly charge-
able to this job during the delay.
5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1094, at 513-14 (1964). There have been many decisions
recognizing and awarding impact damages. E.g., Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. United
States, 397 F.2d 826 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (per curiam) (contractor recovered mobilization
and demobilization costs, plus equipment ownership and maintenance costs during
storage necessitated by changed site condition); Laburnum Constr. Corp. v. United
States, 325 F.2d 451 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (contractor recovered impact damages arising
from defective specifications and delays in approving redesign, attributable to Gov-
ernment-owner); Fischbach & Moore Int'l Corp., ASBCA No. 18,146, 77-1 BCA
12,300, at 59,204 (1976) (impact damages arising from interference with orderly
work sequence of a transmission line recovered by contractor); Coley Properties
Corp., PSBCA No. 291, 75-2 BCA 11,514, at 54,916 (1975) (granted recovery of
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ing from changes or delays in the normal anticipated schedule of
progress. In other words, a change or delay in one part of a project
may impact on other parts of the work, delaying them or rendering
them otherwise more difficult or costly by dislocating them from their
planned sequence.' 4 Such impact damages, the recovery of which is
precluded by a "no damage" provision, are generally recognized as a
genuine and significant element of the increased costs which arise
from changes or delays on a construction project. 15 The function of a
"no damage" clause with respect to such impact costs is best under-
stood by considering several of the numerous situations in which the
clause may come into play.
A. Changes or Errors in Specifications
In a standard construction contract, there are a number of ways in
which the planned progress of the contractor's work may be depen-
dent upon the competent and timely performance of certain obliga-
tions assigned to the owner. In particular, the contractor may rely on
specifications and drawings which are provided by the owner as a ba-
sis for the contractor's bid. 16 Thus, subsequent changes in these
instructions may dislocate the contractor's work from its planned se-
quence.
First, the owner may decide to alter portions of the work, a prerog-
ative generally reserved to it under a standard Changes Clause.17 Sec-
increased costs incurred attributable to delay by Government-owner which reduced
efficiency and interrupted work sequence); City of Seattle v. Dyad Constr., Inc., 17
Wn. App. 501, 565 P.2d 423 (1977) (awarding impact damages despite "no damage"
clause, when owner's actions "demolished" contractor's cost and time structures).
See J. PAUL, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS & SUBCONTRACTS 343-44
(1964); J. SWEET, supra note 6, at 458; Roesler, Recovery of Impact Costs Under the
Pre-1968 Changed Conditions Clause, 31 FED. B.J. 327, 331-32 (1972).
14. In order for a contractor more accurately to compute its bid, it must plan a
schedule of anticipated work progress, focusing on those critical elements of work,
the delay of which will affect overall job completion time. On major contracts, a con-
tractor is often required to submit its planned sequence of operations in advance to
the owner, recorded by "Critical Path Method" (CPM). See generally Wickwire &
Smith, The Use of Critical Path Method Techniques in Contract Claims, 7 PUB. CONT.
LJ. 1(1974).
15. See note 13 supra.
16. See, e.g., cases cited at notes 108-10 infra.
17. The standard federal Changes Clause is reprinted at 41 C.F.R. § 1-7.602-3
(1977). A recent Washington case contained the following example of a Changes
Clause: "The owner, without invalidating the contract, may order changes in the work
within the general scope of the contract consisting of additions, deletions or other
revisions, the contract sum and the contract time being adjusted accordingly." Nelse
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ond, some error or omission in the specifications or contract drawings
may become apparent in the field, requiring redesign or the use of
alternate work methods.' 8 Finally, the drawings may indicate sources
of material (e.g.,"borrow pits" for earthmoving work) which in fact
yield none or far less than what is represented to the bidders.' 9
B. Owner's Duties To Obtain Permits or Issue Intermediate
Approvals
A contract may assign to the owner a duty to obtain certain govern-
mental building or development permits which authorize the contrac-
tor to proceed.20 In addition, the contractor may be required to ob-
tain intermediate approvals or "go-aheads" from the owner before
proceeding at certain designated stages of the work.2' For example,
the owner's approval might be required before the contractor may
proceed from the foundation to the superstructure of a building (e.g.,
to permit owner's inspection). Alternately, an owner's design team
may delay approval of redesign work necessitated by the owner's own
specification errors, changed site conditions, or discretionary changes
under the Changes Clause.22 Any delay on the part of the owner in is-
suing or in obtaining necessary permits and authorizations may di-
Mortensen & Co. v. Group Health Coop., 17 Wn. App. 703, 708, 566 P.2d 560, 563
(1977) (italics in original). In Nelse Mortensen, as is typical, the contract adjustment
provided was limited to direct costs of additional labor and materials attributable to
the owner's changes, plus a fixed percentage for profit and overhead on these items.
Recovery of impact damages was elsewhere expressly precluded by a "no damage"
clause. See note 5 supra.
18. E.g., Laburnum Constr. Corp. v. United States, 325 F.2d 451 (Ct. Cl. 1963)
(erroneous specifications required time-consuming redesign work).
19. See, e.g., Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. United States, 397 F.2d 826 (Ct. Cl. 1968)
(quantity of material in designated "borrow pits" far underran that represented in
contract documents).
20. See, e.g., Leonard Pevar Co., PSBCA No. 219, 77-2 BCA 12,690, at
61,578 (1977) (when Government had duty to secure approval of subdivision plan,
its delay in so doing rendered it liable to contractor for consequent increased per-
formance costs); Bulley & Andrews, Inc. v. Symons Corp., 25 II1. App. 3d 696, 323
N.E.2d 806 (1975) (owner liable to contractor for damages arising from owner-
caused delay in issuance of necessary building permits).
21. E.g., Charles H. Berry, Gen. Contr. Inc., DOT CAB No. 67-47, 69.-2 BCA
7775, at 36,094 (1969) (contractor relieved of late performance damages for delays
in Government's approval of contractor's shop drawings). Cf. Hardie-Tynes Mfg. Co.,
ASBCA No. 20,582 76-2 BCA 11,972, at 57,377 (1976) (contractor recovered
damages arising from Government's failure to either approve or disapprove an alter-
nate construction method submitted by contractor).
22. E.g., Laburnum Constr. Corp. v. United States, 325 F.2d 451 (Ct. CI. 1963).
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rectly delay the contractor's project completion by dislocating work
from its planned sequence.
C. Owner's Duty To Coordinate Independent Contractors
Finally, in the case of a subcontractor, or a prime contractor in a
"multi-prime" contract, 23 a bidder may reasonably assume certain
customary rates of progress on the part of other contracting parties
working independently for the owner on the same project, in order to
schedule its own work in anticipated coordination therewith.24 When
the owner undertakes this duty to coordinate the various contractors,
and a contractor relies upon it, the owner's failure to perform its obli-
gation may lead to disruption of the contractor's planned work sched-
ule, prepared in reliance on the orderly progress of other independent
contractors.
D. Typical Impact Damages
Any of the events outlined above could delay a contractor's prog-
ress, particularly if the segments of work delayed were on the contrac-
tor's Critical Path.2 5 Although a standard Changes Clause provides
for compensating the contractor for the increases in material and la-
bor costs which are directly attributable to the work changed by the
owner, the contractor is likely to incur significant additional damages
due to the impact of such changes in holding up other segments of its
work which were not directly changed. Such impact damages may
arise when a contractor's heavy equipment must stand idle or in stor-
23. The term "multi-prime" is used here to designate a contract in which more
than one contractor contracts directly with the owner. It is more common for an
owner to contract with a single prime contractor, which then undertakes to engage
and coordinate the various subcontractors required on the job. Under a multi-prime
contract, however, each prime contractor may have to rely on the owner to coordinate
other prime contractors in order to maintain efficient progress on the overall project.
24. In preparing its work-progress schedule, either each contractor may assume
that other independent contractors on the job will progress at a rate customary in the
industry, or the contract may specify deadlines for the completion of various segments
of work, by which each contractor can measure the anticipated progress of each other
contractor. See Shalman v. Board of Educ., 31 App. Div. 2d 338, 297 N.Y.S.2d 1000
(1969) (owner impliedly agreed that contractor would not be unreasonably delayed
by failure of other contractors to complete work which was essential to performance
of work in question, and for breach of that duty contractor may recover its resulting
damages from the owner).
25. See note 14 supra.
476
Vol. 53: 471, 1978
"No Damage" Clauses
age while the project is delayed. Work crews may also lose efficiency
by having to work around the areas being delayed. Lengthy delays
may require that workers be laid off and replaced at a later time by
new crews in need of additional training. Work may also be pushed
by delays into seasons of adverse weather or into periods of strikes
and expiring labor contracts, all of which could result in significant
overall cost increases to the contractor. To the extent that a "no dam-
age" clause is enforced, it operates to bar recovery by a contractor of
impact damages such as these.
II. FUNDAMENTAL EQUITIES AND THE RATIONALES
BEHIND ENFORCEMENT
A. General Grounds for and Effect of Enforcement
At least in the absence of a "no damage" clause or similar exculpa-
tory provision, it is generally accepted that when a contractor is un-
reasonably delayed in the performance of its contract by the acts or
omissions of the owner, the contractor may recover its full impact
damages arising from the delay.26 These damages may be recovered
on the basis of breach of the owner's implied duty not to hinder the
contractor27 or for breach of the owner's implied warranty of specifi-
cations.28 Alternately, a court may award impact damages on the ba-
sis of the strong policy of compensation for changes which the court
of claims has found to underlie the standard Changes Clause in the
contract.
2 9
26. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Ashton-Mardian Co., 357 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1966)
(dictum) (contractor delayed in its work through no fault of its own but by virtue of
wrongful act of other contracting party is entitled to damages); Wes-Julian Constr.
Corp. v. Commonwealth, 351 Mass. 588, 223 N.E.2d 72 (1967) (dictum) (in absence
of specific contract provision to the contrary, owner would be bound to refrain from
delaying contractor's work, and contractor could recover for breach of contract for
such delays). In Ericksen v. Edmonds School Dist. No. 15, 13 Wn. 2d 398, 125 P.2d
275 (1942) (dictum), the court stated:
It is undoubtedly the rule in this state, as well as in other states generally, that,
in the absence of any provision in the contract to the contrary, a building or con-
struction contractor who has been delayed in the performance of his contract
may recover from the owner of the building damages for such delay if caused by
the default of the owner.
Id. at 408, 125 P.2d at 279.
27. See notes 99-101 and accompanying text infra.
28. See notes 107-11 and accompanying text infra.
29. The court of claims, in Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. United States, 397 F.2d 826
(Ct. Cl. 1968), declined to enforce an exculpatory provision which conflicted with
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When a "no damage" clause is included in a contract, however, it is
generally enforced to eliminate the contractor's right to recover im-
pact damages.3 0 The fundamental reasoning behind giving such effect
to a "no damage" clause is the judicial presumption that a construc-
tion contract and all its provisions are bargained for at arm's length,31
that they therefore represent the complete manifested intent of the
contracting parties,3 2 and that a contractor can protect itself against
impact damages by including an appropriate contingency for them in
its bid.33 In addition, it is sometimes argued that "no damage" clauses
serve a public interest by protecting owners who are bound by fixed
appropriations against vexatious litigation. 34
B. Exceptions to Enforcement
At the same time, it is generally acknowledged that there are cer-
tain limitations on the freedom of contract presumptions which usu-
ally underlie the enforcement of "no damage" provisions. In their
treatise on government contracts, McBride and Wachtel summarize
these limitations as follows:
The clause will not be enforced if the delay:
1) Was of a kind not contemplated by the parties.
2) Amounted to an abandonment of the contract.
3) Was caused by bad faith.
4) Was caused by active interference.3 5
the principles of reasonable compensation which it found to underlie the federal
Changes Clause:
We have repeatedly indicated that, where [a Changes Clause] (or a comparable)
clause is contained in a contract, the court will construe the agreement, to the
extent it is fairly possible to do so, so as not to eliminate the standard article or
deprive it of most of its ordinary coverage.
Id. at 829. See note 17 supra.
30. See cases cited at note 6 supra.
31. "Based upon the assumption that mature persons dealing at arm's length are
capable of writing their own contracts, no damage clauses are interpreted strictly in
accord with their manifested intent."J. McBRIDE & I. WACHTEL, supra note 2, § 32.10 [5].
32. Id. E.g., Ace Stone, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 47 NJ. 431, 221 A.2d 515
(1966) (parties clearly contemplate that contractor will bear risks of ordinary and
usual types of delay incident to progress and completion); Nelse Mortensen & Co. v.
Group Health Coop., 17 Wn. App. 703, 566 P.2d 560 (1977) ("no damage" clause
was intended to foreclose damage claims based on owner-caused delay).
33. E.g., A. Kaplen & Son, Ltd. v. Housing Auth., 42 NJ. Super. 230, 126 A.2d 13
(1956) (when "no damage" clause is included in contract, bidders presumably weigh
the risk of owner-caused delays in calculating their bids).
34. See note 70 and accompanying text infra.
35. J. McBRIDE & I. WACHTEL, supra note 2, § 32.10[5].
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These exceptions to the general rule of enforceability have been given
at least nominal recognition by a number of courts,3 6 often with ex-
press acknowledgement of the potential for harsh results which may
result from literal enforcement of "no damage" provisions.37 Of these
exceptions, the first is most significant, in part because it essentially
comprehends all four limitations in a single statement. Its consistent
application would require that courts apply a test of foreseeability be-
fore barring a contractor's recovery of impact costs.
There are, however, at least two significant problems with the Mc-
Bride and Wachtel formulation. First, the "contemplation of the par-
ties" limitation to the clause's enforcement is not consistently applied
by the courts.38 The tendency too often is to uphold the clause
without serious inquiry into the extent to which the damages suffered
were actually foreseeable at the time of the contractor's bid.39
Second, characterizing McBride and Wachtel's four situations as
''exceptions" to enforcement promotes a misleading conclusion by
negative implication. Stating that a "no damage" clause will not be
enforced if the delay is not of a kind contemplated by the parties im-
plies that the clause will have some operative effect if the delay is of a
36. A number of courts have conceded that these exceptions limit the enforce-
ability of a "no damage" clause, although concluding that none of them happen to
apply in the case at hand. See, e.g., E.C. Ernst Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co., 551
F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1977); F.D. Rich Co. v. Wilmington Hous. Auth., 392 F.2d 841
(3d Cir. 1968); Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Iowa S. Utils. Co., 355 F. Supp. 376 (S.D.
Iowa 1973); Western Eng'rs, Inc. v. State Rd. Comm'n, 20 Utah 2d 294, 437 P.2d 216
(1968).
37. See, e.g., Ozark Dam Constructors v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 187, 190
(1955) ("a contract for immunity from harmful consequences of one's own negli-
gence always presents a serious question of public policy"); Hallett Constr. Co. v.
Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 261 Iowa 290, 154 N.W.2d 71 (1967) ("no damage"
clause strictly construed due to harsh results often induced thereby); Vanderlinde
Elec. Corp. v. City of Rochester, 54 App. Div. 2d 155, 388 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1976)
("no damage" clause construed strictly); Ericksen v. Edmonds School Dist. No. 15,
13 Wn. 2d 398, 125 P.2d 275 (1942) (such preclusive provisions as a "no damage"
clause given strict construction because of harsh results which may flow from enforce-
ment thereof). See also Sweet, Owner-Architect-Contractor: Another Eternal Triangle,
47 CALIF. L. REv. 645, 681 (1959) (exceptions to the enforcement of "no damage"
clauses arise from equities on the part of the contractor).
38. See, e.g., Wes-Julian Constr. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 351 Mass. 588, 223
N.E.2d 72 (1967) ("no damage" clause held effective to bar contractor's recovery of
"impact damages," even when such damages are attributable to the negligent, un-
reasonable, or arbitrary and capricious conduct of the owner); Western Eng'rs, Inc. v.
State Rd. Comm'n, 20 Utah 2d 294, 437 P.2d 216 (1968) ("no damage" clause is
included to protect the owner with regard to unforeseen delays); Nelse Mortensen &
Co. v. Group Health Coop., 17 Wn. App. 703, 566 P.2d 560 (1977) ("no damage"
clause held effective to bar contractor's recovery of damages for unforeseeable owner-
caused delay).
39. See note 69 and accompanying text infra.
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kind contemplated by the parties. 40 In fact, however, a "no damage"
clause has no operative effect with respect to "delays" 41 which are
within the reasonable contemplation of the contracting parties. Where
"delays" are foreseeable, a contractor is generally required to antici-
pate them and their cost impact in preparing its bid.42 Thus, whether
or not the contract contains a "no damage" clause, the contractor has
no right to recover additional compensation for the impact costs attri-
butable to foreseeable "delays." Only when the delays attributable to
the owner are unforeseeable may a contractor ordinarily recover im-
pact damages, and it is therefore only in this case that a "no damage"
clause, by barring the contractor's recovery, causes a different result
than that which would obtain in its absence. In short, the sole
operative effect of an enforced "no damage" clause is to bar a con-
tractor's recovery of impact damages arising from unforeseeable
owner-caused delays. It follows that if the exception were consistently
applied and courts refused to enforce "no damage" clauses whenever
the delays involved were beyond the contemplation of the contracting
parties, such clauses would have no operative effect.43
What, then, are the legal grounds upon which the enforcement of
the clause might be attacked? To begin with, when the effect of a "no
damage" clause is to impose such an unreasonable liability on the
contractor as to be oppressive, a court might by analogy invoke the
rule against unconscionability, as embodied in section 2-302 of the
Uniform Commercial Code.44 Second, a court might invoke the gen-
40. The notion that "no damage" clauses have operative effect with respect to
foreseeable "delays" appears to underlie one New Jersey decision: "Where parties
enter into a construction contract with a customary no-damage clause they clearly
contemplate . . . that the contractor himself will bear the risks of the 'ordinary and
usual types of delay' incident to the progress and completion of the work." Ace Stone,
Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 47 N.J. 431, 221 A.2d 515, 519 (1966) (quoting Gherardi
v. Board of Educ., 53 NJ. Super. 349, 365, 147 A.2d 535, 544 (1958)).
41. See note 60 and accompanying text infra.
42. See notes 61-66 and accompanying text infra.
43. Where the foreseeability rule is consistently applied to deny enforcement to a
"no damage" clause, the court has gone beyond the notion of strict construction to
avoid harsh results. See note 37 and accompanying text supra. Such a rule in fact
eliminates the entire operative effect of the clause, and a court ought to acknowledge
this necessary conclusion rather than attempting to cloak its decision in the guise of
narrow construction.
44. An analogy to the rule of unconscionability, as embodied in § 2-302 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, provides an unexplored basis for finding harsh results
in the enforcement of "no damage" clauses. This equitable doctrine is applied to deny
enforcement to any contract or contract provision which was unconscionable at the
time it was made. Although Official Comment 1 to § 2-302 describes its purpose as
"the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise" rather than the "disturbance of
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eral rule that a contract or contract term shall not be enforced if it
places one contracting party at the mercy of another.45 Finally, a "no
damage" provision may be challenged on the ground that, in the ab-
sence of actual bargaining, it imposes on a contractor liability for im-
pact damages not within the contemplation of the parties. The follow-
ing discussion will focus on this third argument.46
allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power," it seems self-evident that
an oppressive term could be inserted in a contract as a result of disparity in bargain-
ing power. U.C.C. § 2-302, Official Comment 1. See Shedd, Unconscionability in
Contracts, Gov'T CONTRACTOR BRIEFING PAPER, June 1975, at 3 ("oppression" and
"inequality of bargaining position" are listed together as a single aspect of procedural
unconscionability). A number of cases further support the proposition that inequality
of bargaining power is an important element of an unconscionability determination.
See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 9-40, at 326 & n.48 (2d ed. 1977) (citing
Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971)); J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-6, at 125 & n.66 (1972) (discussion of
Hult Chevrolet, Inc. v. Meier, 2 Pov. L. REP. (CCH) 10,283 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1969)).
In Hult Chevrolet, the court dismissed a car dealer's action to recover liquidated
damages for nonacceptance, amounting to 20% of the contract price. White and Sum-
mers point out that: "Among other things, the court found that the liquidated dam-
ages clause was unconscionable under section 2-302 because the parties had unequal
bargaining power arising from the fact that most car dealers impose similar clauses
and thus eliminate the buyer's freedom of choice." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra at
125. Similarly, in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965), an installment payment contract by which the seller retained a security interest
in all items purchased until the entire aggregate bill was paid up raised a question of
unconscionability. Judge Skelly Wright wrote the following in connection with § 2-302:
"Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful
choice on the part of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably
favorable to the other party." Id. at 449.
Both the Hult Chevrolet and Williams decisions recognized that unconscionability,
as treated in U.C.C. § 2-302, may arise when an oppressive contract term is imposed
by a contracting party with bargaining power significantly superior to that of another.
The very nature of the competitively bid contracting process suggests the same
possibility with respect to "no damage" clauses. When such exculpatory provisions are
commonly included and enforced, a contractor may lose its freedom to choose which
contracts to bid on, being in effect compelled to accept a contract with a "no dam-
age" clause or forego bidding on a significant amount of prospective work. Particularly
in light of the broad, uncertain, and thus potentially oppressive liability thereby im-
posed on a contractor for delay damages attributable to the owner, it seems reasonable
to inquire into the possibilities of unconscionability arising from wide disparities in
the parties' bargaining power.
45. "Sometimes a party will use its superior bargaining power to include in a
contract a clause holding it harmless from liability simply to avoid the expense of a
potential loss." Maurer, Architects, Engineers and Hold Harmless Clauses, INS. LJ.
725, 732 (1976). Dean Prosser has written of such contract terms: "The courts have
refused to uphold such agreements, however, where one party is at such obvious dis-
advantage in bargaining power that the effect of the contract is to put him at the
mercy of the other's negligence." W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 442 (4th ed.
1971). See also Tibbetts Contracting Corp. v. 0 & E Contracting Co., 15 N.Y.2d 324,
206 N.E.2d 340, 258 N.Y.S.2d 400 (1965) (language in contracts placing one party
at the mercy of the other is not favored by the courts; literal absolutism is not
supported by the decisions).
46. All three suggested bases for attacking a "no damage" clause have merit.
Among these distinct though related principles,, however, only the third has had sub-
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C. Absence of Genuine Bargain
Because a "no damage" clause has the potential for imposing a
harsh or oppressive liability on a contractor for delay damages attrib-
utable to the owner, it is appropriate to inquire into the validity of a
judicial conclusion that the clause was incorporated into the contract
by a process of bargaining at arm's length. Is it fair to characterize the
process of competitive bidding47 as a true bargaining situation?
When a project is advertised, a contractor may not generally nego-
tiate with regard to the specific terms of the contract. He must either
submit a bid on the contract as offered to the public or simply refrain
from bidding. In this situation, it is the owner who generally has the
superior bargaining position. 48 This tends to undermine the "freedom
of contract" premises 49 upon which the enforcement of "no damage"
clauses often rests. Of course, it might be argued that a contractor can
always go elsewhere and bid on work which is advertised with more
favorable contract terms, but where exculpatory provisions such as
"no damage" clauses are commonly in use and held valid, it may be-
come difficult to obtain sufficient contract work not imposing such
conditions.
It has also been suggested that, in effect, a contractor is bargaining
when it foregoes its right to recover impact damages in exchange for a
right to a time extension equal in length to the period of delay attrib-
utable to the owner.50 Properly, however, the granting of a time ex-
stantial application in the construction context. See cases cited at notes 59 & 69 infra.
As a result, courts will probably look most favorably upon the "contemplation of the
parties" test as a basis for denying enforcement to a "no damage" clause. See notes
35 & 36 supra.
47. Most construction contracts are awarded through the use of competitive bid-
ding rather than by negotiation. J. SWEET, supra note 6, at 323. In the case of govern-
ment contracts, this is often done pursuant to statutory mandate. E.g., 41 U.S.C. § 5
(Supp. V. 1975); WASH. REV. CODE § 35.23.352 (1976). See Peckar, Liquidated
Damages in Federal Construction Contracts: Time for a New Approach, 5 PUB.
CONT. LJ. 129, 132 (1972) (in federal construction contracting, negotiation of con-
tract terms is a rare occurrence).
48. See Sweet, Liquidated Damages in California, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 84, 117 (1972).
49. See J. SWEET, supra note 6, at 20-21:
[F] reedom of contract assumes two parties of relatively equal bargaining power
who jointly negotiate an agreement. Through the development of mass produced
contracts and the emergence of large blocs of economic power, this earlier model
of the negotiated contract has become the exception. If the state, through its
courts, enforces "adhesion" contracts (contracts presented on a "take it or leave
it" basis), the state is according almost sovereign power to those who have the
economic power to dictate contract terms.
50. See, e.g., S.L. Rowland Constr. Co. v. Beall Pipe & Tank Corp., 14 Wn.
App. 297, 540 P.2d 912 (1975): "Under a provision in a construction contract by
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tension for owner-caused delay is not a remedy51 because the contrac-
tor's otherwise-existing right to impact damages remains uncompen-
sated.52 Rather, such a "grant" is no more than the owner's forbearance
from attempting to collect late performance damages based on owner-
caused delays. Yet it is a generally accepted principle of law that a
party delaying the performance of a contract may not, even in the ab-
sence of an express term granting a time extension, charge the con-
tractor with time damages for consequent delay.53 Therefore, the grant-
ing of a time extension for owner-caused delay is at best an illusory
consideration for a contractor's relinquishing its right to recover
damages under a contract containing a "no damage" clause. Here,
there is no quid pro quo, and there is no true bargain.
D. Foreseeability and Intent of the Parties
When the respective bargaining positions of the parties to a com-
petitively bid construction contract are sufficiently disparate to war-
rant some scrutiny of the owner's efforts to exculpate itself from lia-
bility for damages arising from its own actions, the inquiry must
proceed to those aspects of a "no damage" clause which indicate
whether it in fact reflects the intent of the contracting parties. The key
to ascertaining intent is the unforeseeable nature and scope of impact
damages attributable to the owner.
The first limitation on the enforcement of a "no damage" clause in
the McBride and Wachtel formulation 54 reflects a basic principle of
which the contractor specifically waived claims for damages for any hindrance or
delay and in lieu thereof was granted extensions of time, the contractor was barred
from recovering damages for delays caused by plan changes made by the municipality."
Id. at 305, 540 P.2d at 918 (emphasis added).
51. BL.cK's LAW DICTONARY 1457 (4th ed. 1951) defines "remedy" as: "The
means by which a right is enforced or the violation of a right is prevented, redressed,
or compensated."
52. References to the contractor's actions for breach of contract which would lie
absent an enforced "no damage" provision are contained in notes 26-28 and accom-
panying text supra.
53. E.g., Glassman Constr. Co. v. Maryland City Plaza, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 1154
(D. Md. 1974); Yukon Serv., Inc., AGBCA No. 213, 74-2 BCA 1 10,684, at
50,821 (1974); Gamm Constr. Co. v Townsend, 32 Ill. App. 3d 848, 336 N.E.2d 592
(1975); G. Salvaggio & Co. v. Delta Heights, Inc., 277 So. 2d 754 (La. Ct. of App.
1973); Southwest Eng'r Co. v. Reorganized School Dist. R-9, 434 S.W.2d 743 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1968) (dictum); Fifty States Management Corp. v. Niagara Permanent
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 58 App. Div. 2d 177, 396 N.Y.S.2d 925 (1977); Lovric v. Dun-
atov, 18 Wn. App. 274, 567 P.2d 678 (1977).




contract law-parties to a contract ought not be held liable for dam-
ages beyond their contemplation when the agreement was made. 55
This is closely allied to the general rule that a contract will be inter-
preted so as to conform to the manifested intent of the parties.
When a "no damage" clause is challenged in litigation, many courts
purport to avoid the harsh results of unforeseeability by construing
the clause narrowly.56 The Utah Supreme Court, for example, has in-
dicated that a "no damage" clause might be ineffective to bar a con-
tractor's recovery of damages for delays "not within the specifically
enumerated delays to which the no damage clause is to apply. 57
Other decisions, particularly in Washington, have turned on whether
the time extension provided in case of owner-caused delay was ex-
pressly designated as the contractor's sole remedy. 58 The problem
with such mechanical tests is that they tend to narrow the scope of ju-
dicial inquiry to the form of the clause, which may distract the court
from the more important questions of unequal bargaining power, po-
tential unconscionability, and the foreseeability of impact damages.
In other words, the validity of the exculpatory clause ought to turn
upon the underlying equity of its enforcement and not merely upon
the drafting skills of the parties. 59
55. See cases cited at note 36 supra. See generally Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cot-
ton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 544 (1903) (a person can be held responsible only for the
consequences of breach which were reasonably within the contemplation of the parties
when the contract was made); Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854);
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 329, Comment a (1932) (in breach, one party should
not be charged with damages for harms which it had no sufficient reason to foresee
when it made the contract).
56. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
57. Western Eng'rs, Inc. v. State Rd. Comm'n, 20 Utah 2d 294, 437 P.2d 216, 217
(1968) (dictum).
58. E.g., Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Iowa S. Utils. Co., 355 F. Supp. 376, 396 (S.D.
Iowa 1973) ("It is well recognized that when the language contained in no damage
clauses, is clear and without ambiguity, such clauses will be regarded as valid, and
enforced according to their terms."); Michel & Pfeffer v. Oceanside Properties, Inc.,
61 Cal. App. 3d 433, 132 Cal. Rptr. 179, 184 (1976) ("no damage" clause clearly
indicates intent of parties to make extension of time the exclusive remedy for delay);
Ericksen v. Edmonds School Dist. No. 15, 13 Wn. 2d 398, 409, 125 P.2d 275, 280
(1942) ("Where ... the contract expressly precludes the recovery of damages by the
contractor for delay caused by the default of the owner, that provision will be given
full effect."). Cf. V.C. Edwards Contracting Co. v. Port of Tacoma, 83 Wn. 2d 7,
514 P.2d 1381 (1973) (only after determining that the "no damage" clause was not
specific enough to effectively preclude recovery of owner-caused impact damages did
the court give consideration to the fact that the delays attributable to the owner were
beyond the contemplation of the parties when the contract was made). See also S.L.
Rowland Constr. Co. v. Beall Pipe & Tank Corp., 14 Wn. App. 297, 540 P.2d 912
(1975).
59. See Hawley v. Orange County Flood Control Dist., 211 Cal. App. 2d 708,
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How, then, ought the foreseeability test be applied to the enforce-
ability of a "no damage" clause? In order to adjudge the contractor's
right to recovery in light of the parties' intent, one must first deter-
mine the types of "delays" 60 which may be characterized as foresee-
able, and for which a contractor has no right to additional
compensation from the owner. The presumption is that a competent
contractor should anticipate such "delays" and provide for them in its
bid.
Foreseeable "delays" might include routine periods of time re-
quired for the owner to respond to the contractor's requests for engi-
neering information.6' The slowdown effects of normal winter
weather must also be anticipated when a contract is planned to run
through that period.6 2 In addition, a minimal percentage of error in
drawings or specifications and the delay impact of such errors may in
some cases be foreseeable. 63
These periods of reasonable (or foreseeable) "delay" may arise as
an implied term of the contract, based on custom or general experi-
ence in the industry.64 Alternately, they may be specified by express
provision of the contract. 65 In either case, the significant characteris-
27 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1963) (valid "no damage" clause did not foreclose court from
weighing and considering all facts relevant to determine whether parties actually con-
templated that the clause would preclude contractor from recovering for damages
caused by owner's unreasonable delay in furnishing revised plans).
60. Such "delays" might more accurately be characterized simply as "periods of
waiting," because anticipated waiting periods do not actually delay a contractor's
planned work schedule, which has presumably made allowance therefor. Nonetheless,
the designation "delays" will be used for symmetry: to contrast foreseeable "delays"
with unforeseeable delays.
61. See, e.g., cases cited at note 86 infra.
62. See, e.g., Constructora Pan-Caribe, S.A., ENG. BCA No. PCC-18, 73-2 BCA
10,238, at 48,257 (1973) (17 of the contractor's 34 days of rain-related delay
were foreseeable and thus noncompensable). See also GOV'T CONTRACTOR, Apr. 1,
1974, 1 120 (an example of a foreseeable event is delay due to the effect of normal
weather).
63. In federal construction contracts, however, the rule has been that all delay
due to defective or erroneous Government specifications is deemed unreasonable and
hence compensable. See, e.g., Chaney & James Constr. Co. v. United States, 421
F.2d 728 (Ct. Cl. 1970). However, the portion of the contract documents represent-
ing site conditions to the bidder might be expected to contain a certain minimal per-
centage of error. See, e.g., Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. United States, 397 F.2d 826 (Ct.
Cl. 1968) (it was reasonably, foreseeable that a certain percentage of b.orrow pits
would fail).
64. See, e.g., Hardie-Tynes Mfg. Co., ASBCA No. 20,582, 76-2 BCA 11,972, at
57,377 (1976) (court determined reasonable owner delays as an implied term of the
contract).
65. See, e.g., Nelse Mortensen & Co. v. Group Health Coop., 17 Wn. App. 703,
566 P.2d 560 (1977) (contract included a 15-day schedule of reasonableness within
which architect was to provide interpretations requested by contractor).
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tic of these "delays" is that they are subject to reasonable estimation
at the time the contractor submits its bid.66
It is when the actual changes and delays attributable to the owner
exceed these customary tolerances that they become unforeseeable,
and it is here that a "no damage" clause may force a contractor to
bear liability for owner-caused impact damages which the contractor
could not reasonably anticipate in its bid. In such a case, it is not rea-
sonable to conclude that the parties intended that the "no damage"
clause would operate to bar the contractor's recovery, and the recog-
nized rule of denying enforcement to the clause with respect to delays
beyond the contemplation of the parties should apply.67
It should be emphasized that both the nature and extent of owner-
caused delays may be unforeseeable. Delays which quantitatively ex-
66. It follows that those potential delays which can reasonably be foreseen, either
on the basis of the contractor's experience or on the basis of an express contract term,
may be calculated with sufficient accuracy to make feasible a provision therefor in
the contractor's bid. The contractor need not fear losing its competitive edge in such
situations, since the foreseeability of the "delays" renders it likely that other contrac-
tors are including contingencies of similar magnitude in their bids.
However, to the extent that "no damage" clauses are held to impose liability on the
contractor for unanticipated impact damages attributable to the owner, provision for
such risk by inclusion of a bid contingency is unfeasible. The unforeseeability of this
potential liability puts the contractor in the impossible situation of attempting to
include in its bid an extra sum great enough to cover any possible delay damages, yet
small enough so as not to sacrifice its competitive edge. See Nash & Cibinic, The
Changes Clause in Federal Construction Contracts, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 908 (1967).
Nash and Cibinic state:
It is not practical for a contractor to protect himself from the effects of [impact
damages due to owner changes] . . . by including a contingency in his bid price
because he has no means of predicting the extent to which he will be delayed by
changes. Often the inclusion of such contingencies would result in his bid being
non-competitive.
Id. at 937-38. Thus, the assumption made by some courts (see case cited at note 33
supra) that a contractor is able reasonably to provide by bid contingency for an
uncertain risk of loss is unrealistic in light of the competitive situation in the con-
struction industry. Cf. Peckar, supra note 47 (competition precludes contractors
from including a contingency for liquidated late performance damages when the
extent of those damages is unforeseeable).
67. For example, a contractor may have no way of foreseeing the extent to which
the technical drawings and specifications supplied by the owner will be found in the
field to contain more errors than the percentage which is generally expected. Similarly,
the contractor has no reasonable basis upon which to anticipate the number or mag-
nitude of changes or redesign which the owner may decide to implement during the
project under the authority of the Changes Clause. Nor has the contractor any means
to accurately estimate the potential impact damages arising from delayed issuance of
approvals, "go-aheads," or engineering data which the owner may be obligated to
provide during the job. The extent of these impact damages is unforeseeable because
the events giving rise to them are unforeseeable. An owner's negligence, its noncoop-
eration, and its arbitrary changes in the work are not susceptible to reasonable calcu-
lation at the time a contractor submits its bid.
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ceed what the contractor could reasonably foresee are just as much
beyond the contemplation of the parties as delays which are, by their
nature, outside what the contractor could anticipate.6 8 In either event,
enforcement of a "no damage" clause may have the oppressive effect
of forcing a contractor to gamble on the quality of the owner's specifi-
cations, the owner's promptness in contract administration, and the
owner's moderation in exercising authority under the Changes Clause,
since delay damages arising from the owner's failures in these areas
may be held nonrecoverable.
Courts have not always rationally analyzed the scope of contem-
plated delays. Some have concluded that so long as the type of delay
was foreseeable, the question of its foreseeable extent will not enter
into the determination of whether a "no damage" clause is enforce-
able.69 However, any genuine inquiry into the intent of the contract-
ing parties with respect to the clause must include not only a practical
determination of the delays which were within their reasonable con-
templation, but also a determination of the contemplated magnitude
of such delays.
68. See, e.g., Coley Properties Corp., PSBCA No. 291, 75-2 BCA 11,514, at
54,916 (1975) (recognizing and discussing the significant cost impact of mass
changes, awarding impact damages to contractor on that basis); Kroeger v. Franchise
Equities, Inc., 190 Neb. 731, 212 N.W.2d 348 (1973) (four-month delay of construc-
tion by owner not a revision of Critical Path schedule within meaning of contract
and contemplation of parties); City of Seattle v. Dyad Constr., Inc., 17 Wn. App.
501, 517, 565 P.2d 423, 433 (1977) ("delays may be so substantial as to be beyond
the reasonable contemplation of the parties, and delays may be so large that they
devastate the planned cost and time structure upon which the contractor based his
bid").
69. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Ashton-Mardian Co., 357 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1966)
(court upheld "no damage" provision, upon a finding that potential damage from
delay is inherent in any construction contract, without inquiring further into the
foreseeable extent of such delay); Nelse Mortensen & Co. v. Group Health Coop.,
17 Wn. App. 703, 566 P.2d 560 (1977) (court upheld "no damage" clause, asserting
that as long as owner-caused delay was of a nature contemplated by the parties,
and a time extension was provided, then the delay could not be deemed unreason-
able); S.L. Rowland Constr. Co. v. Beall Pipe & Tank Corp., 14 Wn. App. 297, 540
P.2d 912 (1975) ("no damage" clause held sufficiently broad to bar contractor's
claim for impact damages arising from owner's plan changes; no further inquiry
made by court into the foreseeable extent of such delays).
A similar attitude pervaded the Washington Supreme Court decision in Ericksen v.
Edmonds School Dist. No. 15, 13 Wn. 2d 398, 125 P.2d 275 (1942), in which a "no
damage" clause was given full effect:
The probability of the occurrence of delays was clearly foreseen by the parties to
this action, as the language of the contract repeatedly discloses, and they specifi-
cally provided that the contractor's remedy therefor should take the form of an
extension of time. The presumption therefore is that the parties intended such an
extension of time to be the sole remedy for delays encountered in the perform-
ance of the contract.
Id. at 412, 125 P.2d at 281. First, the court made no inquiry into the presence of
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E. Safeguarding Limited Appropriations Against Vexatious Claims
In attempting to justify the enforcement of "no damage"
provisions, some courts have argued that such clauses are conceived
to further the public interest in protecting government agencies, con-
tracting with fixed appropriations, against vexatious litigation.70 This
notion is, however, strongly refuted by the example of the federal gov-
ernment, which, despite its own fixed appropriations, expressly ac-
knowledges a contractor's right to recover impact damages. 71
Furthermore, a contractor must always carry a substantial burden of
proof to obtain such recovery.72
genuine bargaining to ascertain the parties' true intent. Second, the decision adopted
the dubious characterization of an extension of time as the contractor's remedy. See
notes 50-53 and accompanying text supra. Most important, the court focused solely
on the fact that the occurrence of owner-caused delays was foreseeable, while failing
to consider the fact that the extent of these delays may have been unforeseeable at
the time the contract was made. This was a misapplication of the test of foreseeability.
A better test was recently applied by the Washington Court of Appeals in City of
Seattle v. Dyad Constr., Inc., 17 Wn. App. 501, 565 P.2d 423 (1977): "[D]elays may
be so substantial as to be beyond the reasonable contemplation of the parties, and
delays may be so large that they devastate the planned cost and time structure upon
which the Contractor based his bid." Id. at 517, 565 P.2d at 433. The court in Dyad
held that a "no damage" clause may be unenforceable when it bars a contractor's
recovery of damages for unforeseeable delays, because the clause does not cover
delays amounting to a breach of contract (e.g., breach of the owner's implied duty
not to hinder the contractor). Such a holding conflicts with those decisions which
conclude that a contractor's right to recover for unforeseeable owner-caused hin-
drances and delays may be waived by a "no damage" clause. See cases cited at notes
6, 38, & 58 supra, 102 infra. Thus, the Dyad court comes closer than most to appre-
ciating the importance of applying a true "contemplation of the parties" test.
70. "Stipulations like ["no damage" clauses] are obviously conceived in the
public interest in protecting public agencies contracting for large improvements on
the basis of fixed appropriations or loan commitments against vexatious litigation
based on claims, real or fancied, that the agency has been responsible for unreason-
able delays." A. Kaplen & Son, Ltd. v. Housing Auth., 42 NJ. Super. 230, 126 A.2d
13, 15 (1956). Accord, Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Iowa S. Utils. Co., 355 F. Supp.
376, 396 (S.D. Iowa 1973). Note that this reasoning carries no force by analogy
with respect to "no damage" clauses in contracts advertised by private owners. As
between a private owner and a private contractor, there is no apparent public interest
served by transferring liability for the owner's delays to the contractor. Moreover,
there is nothing comparable to sovereign immunity in the private sector, by which
the fact that a claim may be vexatious or fancied might be used to justify barring a
contractor's right to sue for impact damages.
71. See note 13 supra, notes 74 & 76 and accompanying text infra.
72. Even in the absence of a "no damage" clause, as in federal construction con-
tracts, a contractor must meet the burden of proof in showing both that the owner
caused delays on the project and that whatever impact damages are claimed are
attributable to such delays. "It is axiomatic that a contractor asserting a claim against
the Government must prove not only that it incurred the additional costs making up
its claim but also that such costs would not have been incurred but for Government
action." Fischbach & Moore Int'l Corp., ASBCA No. 18,146, 77-1 BCA 12,300,
at 59,204, 59,224 (1976). Accord, Leonard Pevar Co., PSBCA No. 219, 77-2 BCA
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III. FEDERAL CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS
In contrast to the rules governing contracts under state law, the
body of law which governs federal construction contracts73 consis-
tently recognizes the distinction between those owner-caused delays
which are reasonable and those which are not. In the latter case, the
contractor is permitted to recover impact damages,74 despite the pres-
ence of exculpatory language in the contract.75 Moreover, the federal
government refrains from using "no damage" clauses in its standard
contracts, specifically to avoid the inequities of a bar to the recovery
of impact damages.76 The standard federal construction contract pro-
vides the contractor with an equitable adjustment77 for owner
12,690, at 61,578 (1977) (contractor must show that work was unreasonably de-
layed by act or failure to act of contracting officer and that costs claimed resulted
from such delay).
73. See, e.g., Southwest Eng'r Co. v. United States, 341 F.2d 998 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 819 (1965) (federal law controls in the construction and determin-
ation of rights under federal contracts).
74. See cases cited at note 13 supra.
75. See, e.g., Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. United States, 397 F.2d 826 (Ct. Cl. 1968)
(contractor recovered impact damages attributable to site conditions differing from
those represented by the contract documents, despite Government disclaimer of re-
sponsibility therefor).
76. Under the present standard federal construction contract Changes Clause,
41 C.F.R. § 1-7.602-3(d) (1977), a contractor is expressly granted a right to recover
an equitable adjustment for impact damages (i.e., increased costs of unchanged work)
arising from changes made by the Government-owner. This equitable provision was
added to the standard federal contract intentionally to counteract the doctrine of
United States v. Rice, 317 U.S. 61 (1942), in which the United States Supreme
Court had rejected the fundamental equity of permitting a contractor to recover such
impact damages. The Rice decision was described by one commentator as displaying
"an abysmal ignorance of the effect of delay on the cost of performance." Shedd, The
Rice Doctrine and the Ripple Effects of Changes, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 62, 69
(1963). The results of the decision were also labelled as "basically unfair." Nash &
Cibinic, The Changes Clause in Federal Construction Contracts, 35 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 908, 938 (1967). The court of claims discussed the amendment to the standard
federal construction Changes Clause and its purpose in repudiating the Rice decision
and expressly permitting a contractor to recover impact damages in Merritt-Chapman
& Scott Corp. v. United States, 429 F.2d 431, 445-46 & n.28 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
77. One court reasoned,
Equitable adjustments... are simply corrective measures utilized to keep a con-
tractor whole when the Government modifies a contract. Since the purpose under-
lying such adjustments is to safeguard the contractor against increased costs
engendered by the modification, it appears patent that the measure of damages
cannot be the value received by the Government, but must be more closely re-
lated to and contingent upon the altered position in which the contractor finds
himself by reason of the modification.
Bruce Constr. Corp. v. United States, 324 F.2d 516, 518 (Ct. Cl. 1963). See also
Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. United States, 429 F.2d 431 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (under
federal Changes and Changed Conditions articles, the equitable adjustm6nt shall




changes,78 differing site conditions,7 9 and, under section 32(b), for
any period by which the Government-owner unreasonably suspends,
delays, or interrupts the contractor's performance. 80
In determining that a Government delay is "unreasonable" under
section 32(b), the primary test is foreseeability.8l This approach pre-
supposes that an unreasonable delay will be unforeseeable. Contract-
ing parties are entitled to anticipate reasonable good faith perfor-
mance and cooperation on the part of other parties to the contract.82
Of course, this does not mean that the parties may not include in their
agreement a term fixing mutual obligations and rights in the event of
future breach, but they must do so by means of a valid liquidated
damages clause.83
Thus, where a contractor can make a sufficient showing that it was
damaged by Government delays in excess of what reasonably could
have been anticipated upon bidding the job, it may obtain recovery8 4
which might have been denied under a nonfederal contract containing
a "no damage" clause.85 The first step in this federal contract analysis
is to determine the period of "delay" which the contractor could have
foreseen. This period is then subtracted from the total actual delay to
determine the period for which the contractor is entitled to compensa-
tion.86
78. 41 C.F.R. § 1-7.602-3 (1977).
79. Id. § 1-7.602-4.
80. Section 32(b) reads:
If the performance of all or any part of the work is, for an unreasonable
period of time, suspended, delayed, or interrupted by an act of the Contracting
Officer in the administration of this contract, or by his failure to act within the
time specified in this contract (or if no time is specified, within a reasonable
time), an adjustment shall be made for any increase in the cost of performance
of this contract (excluding profit) necessarily caused by such unreasonable sus-
pension, delay, or interruption and the contract modified in writing accordingly.
Id. § 1-7.602-32(b).
81. See GOV'T CONTRACTOR, Apr. 1, 1974, 120.
82. See notes 99-101 and accompanying text infra. See generally U.C.C. § 1-203
(underlying obligation to act in good faith).
83. See note 92 and accompanying text infra.
84. See cases cited at note 13 supra; notes 74 & 77 and accompanying text supra.
85. The contractor's recovery might be barred absent some further showing of
fraud or active interference on the part of the owner. See notes 6 & 35 and accom-
panying text supra.
86. In Hardie-Tynes Mfg. Co., ASBCA No. 20,582, 76-2 BCA 11,972, at 57,377
(1976), the contractor recovered for impact damages arising from Government de-
lays in responding to requests for engineering information. The Board concluded,
The Government was dilatory in notifying the contractor of whether the requests
were approved or disapproved, and the contractor was injured by the delays due
to the effects of inflation on its costs. . . . In assessing the extent of the delays
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The federal system yields a far more equitable result than that at-
tained where "no damage" clauses are upheld to force contractors to
assume an indeterminate liability for delays attributable to the owner
under circumstances which effectively preclude contractors from cov-
ering the risk in their bids.
IV. ANALOGY TO LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
The foregoing discussion emphasized the harsh effect of "no
damage" clauses in imposing liability on contractors for unforeseeable
delays caused by owners,87 raised the issues of disparity in bargaining
power88 and unconscionability, 89 and summarized the federal con-
tract system as a constructive comparison.90
The legal tests governing the enforcement of liquidated damage
clauses provide an additional illustration of the inequity of enforcing
"no damage" clauses. Liquidated damage clauses are agreements
made in advance of breach, fixing the damages therefor.91 According
to the Restatement of Contracts, such an agreement is not enforceable
as a contract and does not affect the damages recoverable for the
breach unless:
(a) the amount so fixed is a reasonable forecast of just compensation
for the harm that is caused by the breach, and
(b) the harm that is caused by the breach is one that is incapable or
very difficult of accurate estimation.9 2
caused appellant by untimely Government responses to REIs, we must determine
a reasonable time for the Government to make such responses.
Id. at 57,379; see, e.g., Charles H. Berry, Gen. Contractor, Inc., DOT CAB No. 67-47,
69-2 BCA 1 7775, at 36,094 (1969) (fifteen days held to be a reasonable time for
Government to approve shop drawings, and contractor recovered for delays in excess
of that period).
87. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
88. See notes 48 & 49 and accompanying text supra.
89. See note 44 supra.
90. See Part III supra.
91. See C. MCCORMIcK, DAMAGES § 146, at 599 (1935) (emphasis in original):
Liquidated damages are a sum which a party to a contract agrees to pay or a
deposit which he agrees to forfeit, if he breaks some promise, and which, having
been arrived at by a good-faith effort to estimate in advance the actual damage
which would probably ensue from the breach, are legally recoverable or retain-
able as agreed damages if the breach occurs.
See, e.g., Martinson v. Brooks Equip. Leasing, Inc., 36 Wis. 2d 207, 152 N.W.2d 849
(1967) (liquidated damage provision is an attempt to predetermine damages in event
of breach); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339 (1932).
92. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339 (1932).
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These standards for testing the validity of liquidated damage provi-
sions are often cited and generally accepted in both the federal and
state courts. 9 3 Impact damages will probably meet the second crite-
rion--damages will be difficult to determine in the event of breach. 94
The following discussion will therefore focus on the first criterion. In
functional terms, a "no damage" provision in a construction contract
is analogous to a liquidated damage provision. As a result, the former
ought to be invalidated whenever it fails to meet the test of "reason-
able forecast of just compensation for. . . breach" which limits the en-
forcement of the latter.95
A. "No Damage" Clause Fixing Damages for Breach
Before applying the "reasonable forecast of just compensation" test
to "no damage" clauses, it must first be determined that "no damage"
clauses in fact function like liquidated damage provisions, i.e., fixing
damages for future breach of contract.9 6 A contractor is presumed to
have anticipated in its bid the costs associated with foreseeable
"delays"; therefore, it is unreasonable owner-caused delay which is at
93. In the following cases, a liquidated damage provision was tested by the criteria
for enforceability set forth in the Restatement of Contracts: United Order of American
Bricklayers No. 21 v. Thorleif Larsen & Son, Inc., 519 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1975); In
re Plywood Co., 425 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1970); Southwest Eng'r Co. v. United States,
341 F.2d 998 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 819 (1965); Bruno v. Pepperidge
Farm, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 865 (D. Pa. 1966); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Kings Indus., Inc.,
255 Cal. App. 2d 919, 63 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1967); Oldis v. Gross-Rhode, 35 Colo.
App. 46, 528 P.2d 944 (1974); Norwalk Door Closer Co. v. Eagle Lock & Screw
Co., 153 Conn. 681, 220 A.2d 263 (1966); Nu Dimensions Figure Salons v. Becerra,
73 Misc. 2d 140, 340 N.Y.S.2d 268 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1973); Northwest Collectors, Inc.
v. Enders, 74 Wn. 2d 585, 446 P.2d 200 (1968); S.L. Rowland Constr. Co. v. Beall
Pipe & Tank Corp., 14 Wn. App. 297, 540 P.2d 912 (1975) (invalidating a liquidated
damage provision on the ground it was not a reasonable forecast of just compensation
for breach, while simultaneously upholding validity of a "no damage" clause); Brower
Co. v. Garrison, 2 Wn. App. 424, 468 P.2d 469 (1970). See also 5 A. CORBIN, CON-
TRACTS §§ 1059, 1063 (1964).
94. But see Sweet, supra note 48, at 117:
[D] elay caused by the owner or misrepresentation of soil data generally increase
the cost of doing the work to the contractor, and this is a type of damages that
courts are generally able to handle. Since these costs are relatively easy to prove
at the time of trial-apart from a possible dispute over causation or foreseeability-
it is unlikely that a court would enforce a liquidated damages clause for these
breaches.
95. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339 (1932).
96. Support for the conclusion that "no damage" clauses function to fix damages
in the event of breach is found in the fact that courts on a number of occasions have
referred to the contractor's time extension under such provisions as a "remedy." See,
e.g., Ericksen v. Edmonds School Dist. No. 15, 13 Wn. 2d 398, 125 P.2d 275 (1942),
quoted at note 69 supra.
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issue. This kind of delay, arising from design defects, delayed perfor-
mance, or unilateral changes of sufficient magnitude, is unforesee-
able, either in nature or in scope. 97 Unreasonable owner-caused de-
lays breach two major implied owner's warranties: (1) the implied
duty not to hinder the contractor; (2) the implied warranty of specifi-
cations.
The Washington Supreme Court discussed the first of these in Ed-
wards Contracting Co. v. Port of Tacoma:98 "In every construction
contract there is an implied term that the owner or person for whom
the work is being done will not hinder or delay the contract, and for
such delays the contractor may recover additional compensation." 99
This implied warranty includes a duty of good faith 00 and is gener-
ally recognized by both state and federal courts. 101 Some courts have
indicated specifically that a contractor's right to obtain damages for
breach of this implied warranty is foreclosed by a properly drafted
"no damage" clause.102 In the absence of a "no damage" clause, how-
ever, a breach of the implied nonhindrance warranty might arise
when an owner fails to process design changes or work approvals in a
reasonably timely manner, 103 when the owner's changes in the work
exceed a foreseeable magnitude,' 04 and finally, when an owner's ac-
97. See notes 54-69 and accompanying text supra.
98. 83 Wn. 2d 7, 514 P.2d 1381 (1973).
99. Id. at 13, 514 P.2d at 1385.
100. See, e.g., Miller v. Othello Packers, Inc., 67 Wn. 2d 842, 410 P.2d 33 (1966)
(there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract); Long
v. T-H Trucking Co., 4 Wn. App. 922, 486 P.2d 300 (1971) (contracts contain im-
plied condition that parties will not interfere with each other's performance, but will
cooperate in good faith).
101. See, e.g., Burgess Constr. Co. v. M. Morrin & Son Co., 526 F.2d 108 (10th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 866 (1976) (unreasonable delay is breach of im-
plied duty not to hinder other party); L.L. Hall Constr. Co. v. United States, 379
F.2d 559 (Ct. CI. 1966); Glassman Constr. Co. v. Maryland City Plaza, Inc., 371
F. Supp. 1154 (D. Md. 1974) (breach of implied duty to cooperate); Shalman v.
Board of Educ., 31 App. Div. 2d 338, 297 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (1969); V.C. Edwards
Contracting Co. v. Port of Tacoma, 83 Wn. 2d 7, 514 P.2d 1381 (1973).
102. See, e.g., Peckham Rd. Co. v. State, 32 App. Div. 2d 139, 300 N.Y.S.2d 174
(1969), aff'd, 28 N.Y.2d, 734, 269 N.E.2d 826, 321 N.Y.S.2d 117 (1971) (owner may
relieve itself of implied warranty not to obstruct contractor by express language in
contract); Ericksen v. Edmonds School Dist. No. 15, 13 Wn. 2d 398, 125 .P.2d 275
(1942) (contractor precluded by express "no damage" provision from maintaining
action for damages from owner's hindrances and delays). See also note 50 supra
(reference to "specific waiver" of contractor's right to recovery).
103. See, e.g., Laburnum Constr. Corp. v. United States, 325 F.2d 451 (Ct. CI.
1963) (contractor recovered "impact damages" arising from delays in project redesign
and survey authorization attributable to defective Government specifications).
104. See notes 14 & 68 supra. See also note 69 and accompanying text supra.
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tions interfere with a contractor's orderly sequence of work.105 Thus,
inasmuch as a "no damage" clause fixes a contractor's recovery for
such damages at zero, it functions to fix damages for future breach as
does a liquidated damage clause.
A second implied obligation of an owner is the warranty that the
specifications and drawings which are advertised for bidding are rea-
sonably workable. This principle was clearly enunciated in Laburnum
Construction Corp. v. United States:10 6 "If faulty specifications pre-
vent or delay completion of the contract, the contractor is entitled to
recover damages for the defendant's breach of its implied war-
ranty."'1 7 This warranty is consistently implied in federal construction
contracts. 10 8 It has also been given effect in a number of states' 0 9 and
is substantially recognized in Washington.110
In enforcing the implied warranty of specifications, the court in La-
burnum reasoned, "The defendant cannot, by errors in the specifica-
105. See Fischbach & Moore Int'l Corp., ASBCA No. 18,146, 77-1 BCA 12,300,
at 59,204 (1976) (Government suspension of work disrupted contractor's planned
orderly schedule for transmission tower fabrication and erection; contractor obtained
recovery); J. McBRIDE & I. WACHTEL, supra note 2, § 31.80[l] (a forced change in
the sequence of the contractor's work, or a Government failure to observe that se-
quence, is a breach).
106. 325 F.2d 451 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
107. Jd. at 457.
108. See, e.g., United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132 (1918) (implied warranty
that owner's plans and specifications will be adequate); Chaney & James Constr.
Co. v. United States, 421 F.2d 728 (Ct. Cl. 1970); John McShain, Inc. v. United
States, 412 F.2d 1281 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Leslie-Elliott Constructors, Inc., ASBCA No.
20,507, 77-1 BCA 12,354, at 59,783 (1977).
109. See, e.g., Centex Constr. Co. v. James, 374 F.2d 921 (8th Cir. 1967) (apply-
ing Arkansas law); Rosell v. Silver Crest Enterprises, 7 Ariz. App. 137, 436 P.2d 915
(1968); Katz v. Judice, 252 So. 2d 532, writ denied, 259 La. 1049, 254 So. 2d 461
(1971); Alpert v. Commonwealth, 357 Mass. 306, 258 N.E.2d 755 (1970); A.H.
Barbour & Son, Inc. v. State Highway Comm'n, 248 Or. 247, 433 P.2d 817 (1967).
110. The most recent affirmation of the implied warranty of construction speci-
fications in Washington appears in City of Seattle v. Dyad Constr., Inc., 17 Wn. App.
501, 517, 565 P.2d 423, 433 (1977): "[W]hen an owner furnishes plans and speci-
fication for a construction project prescribing a time for completion of the work,
there exists an implied warranty that the contractor will be able to complete the
project timely, as designed." The only apparent limitation on this rule may arise from
the decision in Dravo Corp. v. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, 79 Wn. 2d 214,
484 P.2d 399 (1971), which held that an owner's implied warranty with respect to
represented site conditions could effectively be disclaimed by an express contract
term. Narrowly construed, this decision in no way altered the court's prior recognition
of an implied warranty regarding building methods represented in the specifications.
Prier v. Refrigeration Eng'r Co., 74 Wn. 2d 25, 442 P.2d 621 (1968). Nor does it
appear to apply where the owner's liability is not expressly disclaimed. To the extent
that Dravo upholds a disclaimer of owner's liability for impact damages arising from
site conditions which vary from what is represented to bidders in the contract docu-
ments, it is subject to the same general criticisms which may be offered with respect
to the enforcement of "no damage" provisions.
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tions, cause delay in plaintiff's completion of the work and then com-
pensate plaintiff by extending its performance time and by payment of
any added direct cost occasioned by changes to correct those
errors."'11 This statement illustrates the difference between the rules
governing federal construction contracts and those which apply in the
states which enforce "no damage" clauses; the result being criticized
by the court of claims is precisely that worked by a "no damage" pro-
vision. The Laburnum court held that the contractor's remedy was an
action for breach of contract. 112 It follows that when a state court
holds that a "no damage" provision may bar recovery for impact
damages arising from defective specifications, it effectively holds that
the clause may validly fix the contractor's damages for breach at zero.
Again, the "no damage" clause functions like a liquidated damage
clause.
In short, there are at least two implied warranties which would give
rise to contractor actions for breach of contract in the absence of a
"no damage" clause in the event of owner-caused delay. Whenever a
"no damage" clause works to bar a contractor's recovery of impact
damages under these circumstances, it necessarily functions to fix
damages for future breach.
B. Reasonable Forecast of Just Compensation
A "no damage" clause fixes the remedy for owner's breach at a time
extension plus a reimbursement of increased material and labor costs
directly associated with any work changed under the Changes Clause.
With respect to impact damages arising from the owner's delays, the
contractor's recovery is fixed at zero. Such a remedy cannot qualify as
a reasonable forecast of just compensation, because the clause fixes
impact damages in the event of the owner's breach at an unreasonably
low amount. It has already been established that owner-caused delays
are likely to cause impact damages which may constitute a significant
item of cost to the contractor. The fact that such damages are likely to
result from owner-caused delay is foreseeable when the contract is
made, but the contractor may not reasonably anticipate such possible
damages by a bid contingency because their extent is unforeseeable. It
111. 325F.2dat457-58.
112. Id. at 457, quoted at text accompanying note 107 supra.
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follows that an agreement for the purpose of fixing damages in the
event of breach which precludes any recovery for a substantial ele-
ment of damages arising from such a breach is from the outset not a
reasonable forecast of just compensation.
A further example may clarify the analogy. A contract may set liq-
uidated damages for delayed performance at an essentially nominal
amount (e.g., ten dollars per day) for delays caused by owner's breach
of its implied warranties of specifications and nonhindrance. The ap-
parent majority rule will not permit enforcement of liquidated dam-
age provisions which are either unreasonably high or unreasonably
low. 113 Because these damages are plainly nominal in relation to the
substantial damages which would foreseeably arise in the event of a
delay breach, the clause could properly be invalidated for its failure to
constitute a reasonable effort to forecast just compensation.11 4 A hy-
pothetical contract providing only one dollar per day for owner-
caused delay would logically be even more susceptible to being invali-
113. See Bonhard v. Gindin, 104 NJ. 599, 142 A. 52 (1928); J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, supra note 44, § 14-31, at 566 n.96; C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 149 (1935);
5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 779 (3d ed. 1961). But see Mahoney v. Tingley, 85
Wn. 2d 95, 529 P.2d 1068 (1975). In Mahoney, the Washington Supreme Court held
that a liquidated damage provision in a real estate earnest money agreement would
be enforced even though it limited the seller's recovery to substantially less than its
actual damages arising from the buyer's default. The Mahoney decision rested solely
on a North Carolina decision, Kinston v. Suddreth, 266 N.C. 618, 146 S.E.2d 660
(1966), which held that a seller damaged under similar facts could not recover dam-
ages beyond the amount stipulated in the liquidated damage clause, although such a
limitation was unreasonably low. To the extent that the court in Mahoney concluded
that a liquidated damage clause could still be enforced even though it provided an
unreasonably low amount of damages, the Washington Supreme Court not only re-
versed the court of appeals (see opinion by Horowitz, J., in Mahoney v. Tingley,
10 Wn. App. 814, 520 P.2d 628 (1974)), but it also held contrary to the decided
weight of legal scholarship on this issue.
Furthermore, the facts in Mahoney are distinguishable from those in which a "no
damage" provision is involved. In Mahoney, the party seeking recovery of damages
beyond the liquidated damage sum was the real estate seller, i.e., the author of the
parties' agreement. Contrast this with a standard competitively bid construction con-
tract, in which it is the contractor, and not the author of the contract (i.e., the owner)
which may assert the inadequacy of the liquidated damage sum as compensation for
the cost impact of changes and other delays arising from the owner's breaches. In the
earnest money cases, the seller could simply have demanded more protection, by in-
creasing the liquidated damage amount or by dispensing with the clause altogether.
No analogous option is available to a contractor in a competitively bid construction
contract, which must either be accepted "as is" or not bid on at all.
In any event, although Washington law appears in doubt on this issue, it seems
reasonable to treat as the general rule of the states that a liquidated damage provision
may be invalidated if it provides (at the time of contract formation) either un-
reasonably large or unreasonably small damages.
114. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339 (1932), quoted at text accompanying
note 92 supra.
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dated under this reasoning. Finally, a contract containing a "no dam-
age" clause, limiting the contractor's recovery to zero for breaches
which, because they are unforeseeable, lie outside the terms bargained
for in the contract, is the ultimate unreasonable forecast of damages
and ought to be denied enforcement.
V. CONCLUSION
The operative effect of a "no damage" clause is to bar a contractor
from recovering impact damages arising from unforeseeable delays
which are attributable to the owner. When it is so enforced, the clause
works the oppressive effect of subjecting a contractor to broad and
uncertain liability for which it cannot adequately provide in its bid.
Although the courts have given nominal recognition to the rule that
the clause ought not be upheld to bar the recovery of damages arising
from delays beyond the contemplation of the contracting parties, this
limitation has been neither consistently applied nor clearly under-
stood. Too many courts fail to inquire into the nature of the competi-
tive bidding process, the extent to which it embodies actual bargain-
ing, and the potential for imposing oppressive or unconscionable
terms by one contracting party on another.
When impact costs are foreseeable and therefore calculable, within
reasonable tolerances, a "no damage" clause has no operative effect.
The contractor is barred from recovering additional compensation,
because it is required to anticipate such costs in its bid. When, how-
ever, it is found that the impact damages suffered by a contractor
were unforeseeable and would otherwise give rise to an action for
breach of implied warranties, a "no damage" clause ought not be en-
forced to bar such recovery, for the same reasons that unreasonably
low liquidated damage provisions are not enforced. Because "no dam-
age" clauses are either unnecessary to bar a contractor's recovery
when delays are foreseeable, or impose an unreasonable burden on a
contractor when delays are unforeseeable, equity would best be served
by denying them any operative effect.
Douglas S. Oles
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